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David K. Levine
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#	Item
91	Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:20:24 Subgame perfect equilibrium Solution concept Bargaining problem Mechanism design Ordinal number Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
92	PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT DREW FUDENBERG, DAVID K. LEVINE AND SATORU TAKAHASHI A BSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to on Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-09-12 23:46:36 Group theory Vector space Vectors Constructible universe Nash equilibrium Ordinal number Spectral theory of ordinary differential equations Symbol Algebra Mathematics Linear algebra
93	Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction * Running Title: Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2001-06-16 12:14:50 Sequential equilibrium Bayesian game Extensive-form game Nash equilibrium Rationalizability Self-confirming equilibrium Solution concept Normal-form game Strategy Game theory Problem solving Economics
94	Intellectual Property Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine Washington University in St. Louis Draft Chapter for Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Abstract: Intellectual property is a propaganda term us Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-12-01 03:37:51 Civil law Copyright law Public records United Kingdom copyright law Software patent Intellectual property Copyright Public domain Moral rights Law Intellectual property law Monopoly
95	Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine First Version: May 12, 2006 This Version: February 5, 2010 This paper develops a dual-self model that is compatible with modern dy Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-02-05 05:29:47** Ethics Behavior Decision theory Social psychology Actuarial science Behavioral economics Expected utility hypothesis Allais paradox Self control Utility Economics Behavioral finance
96	A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: November 1, 2007 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-12-13 13:39:35 Generating functions Normal distribution Berry–Esseen theorem Integration by substitution Central limit theorem Moment-generating function Probability theory Mathematical analysis Statistics
97	Ann Math Artif Intell DOI[removed]s10472[removed]A unifying learning framework for building artificial game-playing agents Wenlin Chen · Yixin Chen · David K. Levine Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-02-11 05:55:08 Science Best response Normal-form game Nash equilibrium Repeated game Strategy Reinforcement learning Machine learning Outcome Game theory Problem solving Economics
98	Title: The Castle on the Hill Author: David K. Levine Department of Economics UCLA Los Angeles, CA[removed]phone/fax[removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2000-01-04 12:26:06 Nash equilibrium Repeated game Extensive-form game Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Minimax Subgame Strategy Game theory Problem solving Mathematics
99	Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game* By Phillip Johnson, ([removed]) Centro de Investigacion Economía, Instituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico, David K. Levine, ([removed]) Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2001-07-07 10:56:12 Mathematical structures Altruism Tit for tat Determinacy Strategy Vector space Strategic dominance Flag Structure Algebra Game theory Mathematics
100	Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41 Outcome Strategy Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium